Counterterrorism Measures
An essential part of venue security

By Louis Palumbo

In the post-9/11 world, counterterrorism has become the new buzz word in venue security. And it should be, because the threat is real. In an open and porous society like ours, where we frequently assemble at sporting events in populations the size of small cities, the potential for a truly horrific incident certainly exists. If the events of Sept. 11 didn’t convince us people are evil enough to contemplate such a large-scale attack on a stadium or arena, subsequent evidence and intelligence has surfaced confirming that terrorists indeed consider these venues prime targets.

The good news is that recently nearly every venue has stepped up security. The bad news is that no matter how good security is or becomes, these venues — because they are often filled with large numbers of people — will remain high on the terrorists’ target lists.

Accordingly, it is critical for those who operate large sports arenas and stadiums to develop and implement counterterrorism programs, which are defined as plans that can neutralize terrorist acts directed toward venues and the people visiting them. Venues must create an environment that feels — and indeed is — safe, secure and comfortable if they are to continue to attract the crowds necessary for large sporting events to be economically feasible. People have more concern than ever about security matters and expect to see reasonable and effective measures in place when they come to a large event.

Understanding Large Venues

For the security provider, large public venues present certain challenges to properly protecting them. The most problematic of these is the sheer capacity of the venue. It is not unusual for a facility that is capable of handling 60,000 or 70,000 people to be filled to that level and beyond. This magnitude is the main reason that large venue events are such compelling objectives to the terrorist mind. Add to that the common circumstance of live television coverage — which could instantly send images of chaos and disruption around the world — and one can easily see why these sites might be targeted.

There are operational complications arising from these high numbers as well. When there is a full house, it exacerbates the difficulty of reacting to an incident, especially emergency evacuation because there is much less room for error. Everything has to work perfectly. If one exit doesn’t function, one ramp is blocked or one weapon gets in, the consequences could be disastrous.

There are also characteristics about most large venues that are helpful in devising antiterrorism measures. For instance, most of these venues tend to have a single-event orientation, with the site employed exclusively for a specific game or concert for an allotted period of time. In other words, the venue is not being shared with an organization having another agenda, as sometimes happens at hotels, convention centers and public parks.

Most new or recently renovated stadiums are well designed with safety in mind. The design plans are reviewed and approved by the local fire department or the municipalities where they are located. This important third-party review helps ensure that essential elements like a sufficient number of fire extinguishers, adequate easement in the aisles, safe distances between seats and enough points of ingress and egress are in place — all based on maximum occupancy. As a result, even though a security agency may not be directly involved with the blueprinting of a facility, there is generally an inspection that meets a fairly high standard with city authorities.

Implementing the Basics

While every venue is unique, there are several basic steps that apply in almost every situation.

These form the framework of a good counterterrorism plan for large stadiums and arenas. Those responsible for security should:

• Establish a perimeter with boundaries extending well beyond the physical walls of the facility or institution. Having control of the immediate surrounding area allows security to control the flow of access and to thoroughly screen patrons, while also providing ample room for staging and equipment set up.

• Create strategically placed choke points, where means of ingress and egress to the facility are deliberately limited. Taking full advantage of the expanded perimeter, these choke points should be as far out from the building line as possible. If an incident occurs, the closer it is to the building the more serious the likely results. In an evacuation, the more remote the choke point is, the quicker the facility itself can be emptied.

• Add the means to screen every person coming into the venue. The key tools here are magnetometers — walk-through machines like those in the airports — and supplemental hand wands. In some instances, it is cost effective to have hand searches for packages and bags, though x-ray machines are more accurate. In many cases, a simple ban on such items is preferred.

• Provide emergency medical resources. In addition to having ambulances and EMTs on site, the locations, capacities and capabilities of nearby local trauma centers should be identified and routes to them — via primary and secondary roads — should be outlined.

Reacting to the Threat

This framework doesn’t address every situation.

To be truly prepared, those responsible for security at a large venue or event must answer two questions: 1) Is there reason to believe there is a specific threat related to the venue or the event? 2) Are there circumstances that could make the venue or event especially vulnerable?

The first question requires venue operators to evaluate any intelligence available. If there is information immediately at hand that specifies a particular threat, whether from direct knowledge, local law enforcement, or the state or federal government, then the necessary counterterrorism measures should go far beyond the basic steps outlined above. At that point, venue security, security consultants and local police should expect and encourage help from federal agencies, who can provide the proper coordination and division of responsibilities. For example, under such a scenario, who will handle a suspicious package? Who will make a decision concerning evacuation? Should there be a ban on flights over the venue and who will approach the Federal Aviation Authority about securing such a ban? Depending on the nature and the level of the threat and its source, federal agencies may decide to take the lead role.

The second question requires venue operators to know their stadium or arena and to prepare for the worst-case scenario based on its individual characteristics. That process involves identifying all the possible exposures and vulnerabilities of that venue, such as its location within the community, its age and design, the quality and size of security staff, the nature of the crowd that is expected, the type of seat assignment being used, etc. All these things will have a bearing on the measures that should be taken. These considerations should be shared and addressed with local law enforcement authorities, who should always be consulted in preparation for large attendance events.

A good example of the way threat assessment can affect counterterrorism programs is the approach taken at the last two Super Bowls. At the 2002 Super Bowl in New Orleans, the Secret Service took responsibility for coordinating venue security. A year later in 2003, when the threat assessment was different, the Secret Service’s level of involvement and that of other federal agencies were reduced, with more of the responsibility left to the venue itself and the San Diego police department, in whose jurisdiction the stadium resided.

Assessing the Current State of Play

In the final analysis, it is difficult to determine if large venues are safe. It varies considerably — not just on a venue-by-venue basis, but on an eventby- event basis. Certainly venue operators, local law enforcement authorities and municipalities should consider periodic reviews by security consultants, who bring with them knowledge of best practices at other stadiums and arenas, experience with different types of events, and practical understanding of the way internal and external resources should be coordinated to address specific challenges.

The major change that must occur if we are to secure these facilities against terrorism is to elevate the level of supervision, screening and planning that occurs at every event, with special attention given whenever circumstances raise the likelihood of attack.

With security being taken more seriously across the country, local police departments realize the importance of their role in protecting these facilities and the general public has accepted the increased levels of scrutiny. It is important that the industry take advantage of this to develop and implement measures necessary to deal with the threat — for as long as our nation wages war against terror. As time passes, complacency will be our biggest enemy.

That is why it is so critical to put strong measures, based on worst-case scenarios, in place immediately and then maintain them as a permanent part of stadium and arena operations.

Lou Palumbo is director of The Elite Agency Ltd., a global security, protection and intelligence firm. He is a former New York police detective with 23 years experience in security, protection and intelligence. For additional information, contact eliteltd@aol.com.